As mentioned previously, this will be the last part in a three-part series on the Canadian military. The previous instalments can be found here and here. Having covered the historical and the present facts, we felt compelled to present a set of proposals about the way our military should be improved in the future.
While military operations should be left to soldiers and officers, military policy is a matter of civilian public policy. This is because the military is an inherently political institution and inextricably linked with public life. This list would be fully aspirational, as we believe that a functional military is beyond the ken or even the interest of our current political elite.
The following piece has been broken down into three broad categories: recapitalization and manpower, geographic placement, and military culture.
Manpower and Recapitalization
The size of our forces must be adapted to the roles we can reasonably expect our soldiers to fulfill, both today and in the future. Naturally, this depends on the role that we anticipate playing on the international stage. Armed forces are no longer merely an affair of territorial defence and conquest. There is also the matter of the amount of resources our government can be expected to marshal. One cannot simply point to the comparatively immense force we fielded during the world wars as an example of the type of armed forces we could have now. These armies existed not only during a time of total war, but also at a moment in history where the average soldier, tank, ship and airplane cost comparatively little.
Thus, while Canada’s population of 35 million could theoretically sustain an army of 1 to 2 million from a manpower perspective, such a proposition would be fantastically expensive. Only a massive downgrade in equipment, training quality and pay, coupled with the institution of conscription, would allow us to reach such numbers. Still, a balance should be struck between a token force of 90,000 (all three elements of which only about 67,000 are regulars) and an armed service the likes of which only great powers and tin pot dictatorships can sustain. One cannot venture an exact number for this, but it would certainly be north of a 100,000 figure and possibly higher. This number should not be outlandish given the fact that the CAF boasted 105,000 members in 1989 before the post-Cold War Force Reduction Program slashed effectives.
An increase in numbers would have to accompany a serious recapitalization effort. This would encompass the standing-up of entirely new formations, the opening of new bases across the country and the purchase of new war stocks to equip this larger force. All in all, we believe that our three undermanned combat brigades are not enough to allow for proper force generation and reconstitution, as we saw during Afghanistan. In this period, one brigade would be committed to the deployment, one would be working up for it and one would be reconstituting, often while detaching its effectives to the other two active brigades.
This constant rotation between the three formations (1,2 and 5 CMBG) left the men and the equipment overtaxed. Standing up a fourth brigade with its associated infantry, armored, air, artillery, engineering and support assets would alleviate the wear and tear on equipment and the stress on soldiers. In would introduce a fourth placeholder in the rotation, allowing for more time for soldiers to recuperate in case of a long deployments. This would reduce the incidence of burnouts, increase overall mental health and help with retention of personnel who would otherwise release or become casualties (both mental and physical) to be dealt with by an already overstretched system. The additional effectives would also be useful in civil aid scenarios, giving the federal government more flexibility on how it could deal with disaster response scenarios.
Our navy has suffered from neglect for too long and has been reduced from the power it was during WW2 to little more than a token force. Our last carrier was retired decades ago and our destroyers have been decommissioned. This leaves us with: 12 Frigates that are beginning to show their age, 4 second hand diesel electric submarines plagued with technical issues and a fleet of coastal patrol vessels. The latter are too lightly armed to serve as actual warships and devoid of the proper design elements needed to act as minesweepers. As things stand, what is arguably our most essential element – the one that should in theory be the first able to deploy on a short notice – must make do with obsolete ships and personnel shortfalls in the hundreds.
Furthermore, our fleet is not adapted to our current defense needs. The frigates cannot sail the arctic and our diesel electric submarines cannot be expected to loiter under the ice the way nuclear subs could. While the icebreakers promised by the Conservatives are finally making their way to the fleet, their ice breaking rating is the lowest possible and they cannot operate in winter ices. Thus, we are essentially giving the Russians (who possess both nuclear attack submarines and heavy nuclear icebreakers) the advantage over our waters. Worse yet, our inability to properly assert our sovereignty on the arctic front might lead Uncle Sam to pick up the slack in ways that we might one day find disadvantageous. To this end, the fleet must be enlarged and equipped with heavy armed icebreakers, equipped at the very least with anti-submarine and anti-aircraft capabilities as well as long range sensors. Their role should be to act as a deterrent against both Submarine threats and air incursions.
We must acquire nuclear attack submarines that can patrol under the ice sheets for extended periods of time and thus threaten any potential ship or submarine operating in the area. For the Atlantic and Pacific fleets, the focus should be on modernizing the fleet by acquiring newer frigates and by complementing their numbers with larger anti-surface ships. Finally, the fleet should acquire at least two assault carriers able to carry a small complement of F-35B fighter aircrafts and a substantial number of army troops thus allowing us to sustain troop deployments independently.
Finally, the air force needs to see its assets increased substantially, particularly in the AWAC (Airborne Early-Warning and Air-Control), with the acquisition of more jet fighters (partially to attach to the fleet’s assault carriers) and bolstering its numbers. The current projected number of fighters that will replace our aging F-18 has been stated to be 88 by the current government. Considering that many will be used in training as well as the loss of airframes through attrition, such a number would leave us dangerously low on operational fighters within a few decades. We should at the very least aim to match the number of 138 F-18s that were acquired by the government in the 80s, plus whatever is needed for the fleet.
In addition, a number of attack helicopters should be acquired. Afghanistan proved to us that even poorly equipped militias could be a serious threat to our transport helicopters. The RCAF’s response was to outfit our CH-146 Griffons with door mounted machine-guns. As s stop-gap solution, they worked well enough but the near loss of a Chinook due to combat damage on August 5, 2010 outlines the need for better escorts. Apache longbows, Cobras or even the Eurocopter could fill this role and would, as an added bonus, be able to give our troops Close Air Support (CAS). This department is one in which our forces have lagged behind for many years. To this end, a fleet of 60 attack helicopters would be required (12 per brigades and another 12 for a training squadron.)
These numbers may appear daunting and they would indeed require tens of billions of dollars in expenditure over some two decades and the doubling of our current budget (which would coincidentally bring us within the NATO target of 2% of our GDP). However, they are not so outlandish that an advanced economy like Canada could not handily support such a force if her priorities were in order. 4 to 5 billion dollars could be recovered from the treasury by slashing foreign aid, an entirely superfluous expense, the rest could be covered by a modest increase in income taxes and sales taxes. Of course, a long-term thinking government could be more imaginative than this, and this piece will leave aside options such as expanded sovereign wealth funds. Canada can be as strong middle power able to assume its own defence and flex its muscles when it needs to be. If not, it can choose to be a middling vassal to an American hegemony that still seems a long way off from finally putting its own house in order.
Geography
The current smattering of military bases is inadequate. The distance of many bases from our city centers make the military into an unattractive choice of career for the new increasingly cosmopolitan generation of Canadians. It simultaneously keeps city dwellers and soldiers apart and thus limits the cultural influence of the military. This has to do with the closure of many bases throughout the Cold War but is likely also a deliberate move by successive Liberal governments (facilitated by Conservative inaction). Recapitalization of the forces is quite possible; however, the current public finds any increase in defense spending hard to swallow. This is as much a problem of culture as it is of perception. Both of these questions can be acted upon by moving bases closer to cities.
Let us take the examples of Baggotville and Cold Lake. Both are fighter bases for aircrafts that require very talented individuals’ years to master. Individuals with skills and the motivation to do quite well for themselves in the civilian world. These men are forced to sign away years of their lives to pursue their vocational aspirations but are then forced to do so in remote areas. They are away from family, friends and networks; away from the cities and the public; away from a standard of living the younger generations consider to be necessary. Similar things can be said of other rural areas such as the bases in Shilo, Wainwright, Petawawa and Gagetown. All are important army installation, yet all situated in very remote areas. Their placement appears oriented towards sustaining a local economy rather than considering how they might serve personnel needs and recruitment incentives.
The Canadian Armed Forces have suffered immensely from retention issues in the past few decades. Part of the issue, in our opinion, is the refusal of the old guard to recognize the fact that the expectations of younger Canadians have changed drastically with regards to quality of life. The old offer of a steady job being good enough even if it far away is no longer appealing. What is the point of a large paycheque if one cannot use it? Young people being shipped off to remote areas will find it quite difficult to find a spouse, take part in civic life or have a presence in the cosmopolitan lifestyle most Canadians now enjoy these days. Furthermore, such a placement alienates the forces from the rest of the population. It is abnormal in military terms that there are no major concentrations of troops near our most important urban centres: Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver.
The argument that large training areas are needed is rendered moot by the fact that said areas would not need to be relocated, only the units. Training could continue taking place in the established training zones, it is the formations’ administrative centers and the soldiers’ homes and offices that would be moved closer to urban centers. This would have the effect of improving retention by offering the troops the ability to live closer to or in cities and thus to increase quality of life. Furthermore, the increased contact between the civilian population and our troops would improve the armed forces public image more than any advertisement campaign. These soldiers would make socialize and build ties with the population more readily.
Additionally, the economic benefits of local bases would affect more people than in rural areas with limited populations. Some in our readership may take exception to the proposal that our uniformed personnel be put in close contact with the teeming hives of decadence that modern urban landscapes have become. In fact, the opposite argument may be made. The presence of large concentrations of servicemen and women might help to expose the civilian population to an ordered mindset with a sense of duty. This venerable Canadian tradition would be embodied in the familiar appearance of our nation’s uniforms and promoted by professional, well turned out soldiers, sailors and airmen,
Were a fourth brigade to indeed be formed, one of our three large agglomerations should be home to it. Toronto would be a good choice given the fact that her large population would serve to man the formation. The formation would also have an easier timer recruiting in the local population as its proximity would overcome the resistance of many younger Canadians to entirely uproot themselves. Vancouver, for her part, could see her suburbs become home to a new airbase. The opportunity for young, talented Canadians to live and work near one of our most dynamic cities would be enhanced with the benefits of a large multifunctional airbase on the Pacific coast. As an aside, it would also be able to house the fighter jets for the earlier proposed amphibious assault carriers.
As a final note on recruitment: funds should be invested in ensuring that serving members are given as many civilian equivalencies, university credits and other professional credentials as possible as a result of successfully completed terms of enrollment. Though the option of completing a contract and immediately moving on to civilian life might create more turnover, it would also help with recruitment. Many of our poorer citizens would have the option of using the armed forces as a stepping stone towards a constructive career in the civilian world. A high turnover force (at least with the rank and file tradesmen) would have the added of benefit of increasing the percentage of veterans in the population. These men and women would go on to carry the values of respect for authority and reverence for tradition to the broader population.
Military Culture
The prior pieces in this series have taken the position that Liberal Party governing class sought to utterly decimate the spirit and culture of our armed forces. It is under P. E. Trudeau that our services lost their traditional uniforms, steeped in centuries of British military tradition. Instead, they adopted a cheapened, Americanised garb with no link to the past. It was a deliberate insult to our armed forces and one which, under the circumstances, was unprovoked. This malice can still be seen today, as our armed forces have certainly lost the air of Christian and European respectability that once characterised them in culture and appearance. This author would promulgate a complete return to pre-unification uniforms and rank structures.
Furthermore, the tide would need to be turned against the culture of toxic egalitarianism that has swept through the Canadian Armed Forces. Professionalism has remained but is motivated more by careerism than by love of service for its own sake. Pomp and ceremony seem to have been relegated to something of a necessary annoyance rather than the supremely important cohesion-building and example-setting ritual. One need only watch the almost comical tri-service parades that often take place in Ottawa featuring ranks of multi-colored (blue-green-black) and often obese clerks led by similarly unimpressive officers.
While some of the old warrior spirit certainly remains in line units, gone is the temperance of the old military ethos, replaced mostly by self-indulgence and a quasi-mercenary attitude towards service. While these words might sound harsh and even exaggerated, one need only pay attention to the news coming out of our military to see that something is rotten with the culture. Whether it be the rash of sexual misconduct incidents that led to OP Honour, the staggering number of suicides out of the Military College (8 or so in the last 4 years), the firing of Vice-Admiral Norman for ostensibly attempting to do right by his country and his service, one can surmise quickly that something is indeed rotten in the state of the CAF.
Conclusion
We hope that readers will take the above suggestions as inspiration for further thinking on this issue. A culture of love of the service and martial pride must be restored to the CAF and the Canadian people. This must start with the restoration of the inherited identities and the rebirth of our ethos. No more should the armed forces play host to the progressive agenda with its minority quotas and obsession with corporate style PR. Our military is not simply a tool for political posturing or even foreign policy, but a key instrument in the shaping of our identity.